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AN ARGUMENT AGAINST AHISTORICAL "DIFFERENCE"
IN FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORY
By Hawley Fogg-Davis'
In the afterword to her book, Women in Western Political Thought, Susan Okin offers one
possible explanation for the frustration that seems to accompany any attempt to talk about feminist
political theory these days.2 That frustration has to do with the relationship between theory and
practice. What should this relationship look like? Okin observes, "most women can see that many
of their rights and their theoretical options in life have increased, in part through the efforts of
organized feminism. But in practice, many women are in some ways worse off now than fifteen
years ago."3 Feminist political theorists should, in Okin's view, "spell out, explicitly, the policy
implications that follow from their theoretical conclusions .... "'
Okin traces this problem in feminist political theory to an ongoing two-tiered debate over
the political significance of differences, On one hand, feminist critics have debated the political
significance of differences between women and men; on the other hand, they have disagreed over
the political significance of differences among women.' It is Okin's opinion that "[b]oth issues of
contention tend to cause divisions among feminists both as activists and as theorists, and may
therefore partly explain the disparity between the current health of feminist theory (for theory often
thrives on contention) and the relative weakness of feminist politics (which is often impeded by
it).' 6 This article addresses the second of Okin's concerns.
This concern began, according to Okin, "as a dispute within feminist politics as early as
1970, and was only later debated among theorists."' She continues, "[e]arly in Second Wave
feminism, black, working-class and lesbian women began to protest that the movement, dominated
by white, middle-class heterosexual women, excluded them and their concerns."' As it was taken
up by theorists, this concern became known as the anti-essentialist critique, its proponents often
referred to as "difference feminists." While Okin's warning regarding the proliferation of claims
based on difference is well-taken, I wish to challenge her blanket description of so-called
anti-essentialist critiques- Like many political theorists, she fails to critically examine the ways in
which the historical tension between white and black Americans continues to mold our
contemporary understanding of difference.
WEB. DuBois rightly predicted that the problem of the Twentieth Century would be the
color-line.9 How does the problem of the color-line impact feminist political theorizing'? In this
article, I argue that although the anti-essentialist critique has been stretched by Okin and other
scholars to include many differences among women such as class, sexual orientation, physical
ability and age, it remains a racialized critique. Black women have long been forced to live under
I

Hawley Fogg-Davis is a graduate student in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, where she is

working on the politics of transracial adoption.
2

SUSAN M. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

3

Id. at 310-1I.

4

Id. at 311.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 325.
Id

5

6
7

a

310 (1992).

W.EB. DuBois, THE SOULS OFBLACK FoiK I (Penguin Books 1989) (1953) ("Herein lie buried inany things which
if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Century.
This meaning is not without interest to you, Gentle Reader- for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem
of the color-line.")
9

CIRCLES 1996 Vol. IV

ostensibly neutral code-words: welfare queen, teenage mother, matriarch, to name just a few. All
of these words signify black women across socio-economic class, physical ability and sexuality.
For example, Clint Bolick's Wall Street Journal Op-ed piece branding Lani Guinier a "Quota
Queen" demonstrates the commonplace use of buzzwords to stigmatize middle-class black
women.' 0 Okin's reference to the anti-essentialist critique of feminist political theory replicates
this coded allusion to black women. Much like the political rhetoric of controlling the
"inner-cities," white feminists' reference to difference feminism is, I believe, an attempt to
simultaneously dilute and contain blackness.1 ' Moreover, these linguistic manipulations comprise
what Stephen Steinberg has diagnosed as the white liberal retreat from race, a post-Brown v.
Board2 of Education attitude that deems socially and politically taboo any direct references to
race.'

I will discuss the work of Judy Scales-Trent and Kimberle Crenshaw, two black female
legal scholars whose work on black women as uniquely situated persons with respect to the
Constitution shows a critical awareness of black-white tensions as the fundamental difference
paradigm. Judy Scales-Trent argues in a 1989 article for the Constitutional definition of black
women as a distinct group with a legal identity of its own.' Kimberle Crenshaw has theorized
about black women's unique "practical" experiences of being "in-between" the categories of race
and sex in anti-discrimination cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, or
constitutionally under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4
DISENTANGLING DIFFERENCE: WHY THE DEBATE IS BLACK AND WHITE

Scholars increasingly deploy new terms to describe the changing racial and ethnic
demographic make-up of America. By the year 2000 we can expect to have a work force that is
eighty-five percent non-whitc. 5 Within the past decade, political theorists have addressed this
demographic shift under neologisms like multiculturalism, diversity and difference feminism.
Multiculturalism and diversity, as philosophical values in public school education, have been hotly
debated among political theorists.' 6 Feminist political theorist, Iris Marion Young, has endorsed a
theoretical approach to American politics which values a plurality of group differences-'" Young
upholds what she calls democratic cultural pluralism, a political model that envisions the good
Apr. 30, 1993 at A12.
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society as "equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one
another and affirm one another in their differences.""
The de-Anglicization of America merits thoughtful intellectual inquiry- The problem with
multiculturalism and diversity arguments is that they often present ahistorical or de-historicized
pictures of racism in the United States. As Avery Gordan astutely observes in her study of
diversity management in American corporations, the terms multiculturalism and diversity are
currently used by "anti-racist" white liberals as "positive" and more "progressive" substitutes for
affirmative action which is considered "backward" in its remedial justification. 9 Whites perceive
diversity as less threatening because, unlike affirmative action, it does not cost them personally.2 By celebrating diversity, whites can adopt a de-historicized, nominal anti-racist position while
perpetuating institutional arrangements which have historically disadvantaged blacks. All of this is
carried out in the name of a more "progressive" philosophic value: diversity. Still, even though
diversity empties race of its historical and socio-economic meaning, it signifies blackness in coded
form as the paradigmatic difference. This phenomenon reflects Steinberg's depiction of a post Civil
Rights Movement "liberal retreat from race."'"
When Okin criticizes the difference feminists as if they were one group, she falls into the
same problematic line of philosophical inquiry. What is missing from both the
multiculturalist/diversity arguments and Okin's work is an historical account of how race has
functioned throughout the history of the United States as the blueprint for difference. When Okin
writes that, during the 1970s and '80s, "black, working-class and lesbian women began to protest
that the movement, dominated by white, middle-class heterosexual women, excluded them and their
concerns," she creates the misleading impression that all three of these groups of "different" women
voiced a concerted critique of the feminist movement at the same historical moment.22 Contrary to
Okin's characterization, black women's organized public criticism of white feminists' racism
pre-dates the Second Wave considerably. Sojourner Truth's 1851 "Ain't I a Woman?" speech at
the Women's Rights Conference in Akron, Ohio remains a pivotal indictment of white women's
racist depiction of black women as "not woman enough."2 3 At the same time, as Kimberle
Crenshaw points out, white feminists have often translated Truth's words into generic feminist
slogans, emptied of Truth's clear indictment of white suffragettes.24
Crenshaw reminds,
"[c]ontemporary white feminists inherit not2 5the legacy of Truth's challenge to patriarchy but,
instead, Truth's challenge to their forbearers."It is this legacy that must be addressed on its own terms, thoughtfully and honestly by
white feminist political theorists. U.S. feminism has been fundamentally shaped, from tile
First
Wave, by a critical tension between whiteness and blackness. White suffragettes agitating for the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment couched their political plea explicitly in racial tertns In a
debate with Frederick Douglass, Susan B. Anthony urged, "[ijf intelligence, justice, and morality
are to have precedence in the Government, let the question of woman be brought up first and that
of the Negro last., 26 Later, during the House debates over the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
18 Id. at 163.
19 Gordan, supra note 15 (noting that diversity management in corportations has become a beg business unto
itself. Many corporations hire diversity managers to conduct workshops designed to sensitize employees to
differences in the workplace. These workshops are usually custom made to suit a particular corponion, and are
pitched to employees as a source of communal fun /pleasure. With diversty management there is no need to dwell on
negative like racism. Unlike affirmative action, diversity gives the illusion of a race neutral meritocracy.)
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1964, white women dramatically argued that if sex was not added to the bill, the status of white
women would diminish in relationship to black women." Representative Griffiths, a white woman,
threatened her white male colleagues, "if you do not add sex to this bill ...you are going to try to
take the colored men and colored women and give them equal employment rights, and down at the
bottom of the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at all."28 Griffiths' words illustrate
the kind of black-white tension that has shaped feminist politics.
The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution, which legally abolished slavery and
stated that blacks were to have the right to vote and equal protection of the laws, set the framework
within which white women began campaigning for their right to vote. In the 1960s and early 70s,
the push for analogous treatment of race and sex discrimination succeeded in changing both the
legislative and executive branches' approach to sex-based laws.29 In 1971, the Supreme Court held
for the first time that sex-based classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause if such
classifications do not bear a "fair and substantial relationship to legitimate ends."3 Existing sex
discrimination law is an expansion of anti-discrimination law based on raceThis brief overview is meant to re-historicize "difference feminism," to expose its racial
underpinnings as a critical, under-theorized foundation of feminist politics. We find that instead of
being just another "difference," race emerges as the key historical force in the shaping of feminist
political thought. Sheila Foster explains that while there are many differences among persons that
bring on individual and isolated biases, prejudices, and preferences, "race has a deep social
significance that continues to disadvantage blacks and other Americans of color on a systematic
level."31 While on some level all women may be oppressed because of their gender, race shapes
gender oppression fundamentally for all women.
Some may object to my centering of race as the paradigmatic oppression in the United
States, and argue instead that class divisions form an even deeper mode of oppression in the United
States. I agree that one needs to explore the socio-economic factors of oppression; I do not believe
that race and class can be treated as distinct forces at work in this country. I am interested in
developing a sophisticated understanding of how class works in conjunction with the constniction
of blackness in the specific case of the United States, but such inquiry falls outside the scope of my
project here. At this point I can only say that it would be too simplistic to expect that a class
analysis alone could serve as the definitive oppression paradigm.
Here I am engaged in a more limited investigation. Primarily, I aim to rescue race from
the "difference" lists which now dot the feminist landscape. Picked up and literally swept away in
these increasingly routinized lists, race becomes a less threatening, less indicting presence.
Difference lists empty race and gender and every other "difference" from their historical and
socio-economic meanings, a disturbing phenomenon that Patricia Cain calls "the perfunctory
footnote, dropped the first time the essential category 'woman'is mentioned, which acknowledges
the differences of race and class, and sometimes sexual differences. Such politically correct
footnotes name the differences, but I see no evidence in the accompanying texts that the preferences
matter" 3 2 Cain identifies a problematic superficial inclusion of differences that Okin replicates
26
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when she contends
that one can separate gender and racial oppression without treating race as
3
insignificant.

The problem for this paper is Okin's placement of race on an ahistorical difference list, It
is, I think, no coincidence that race appears first on Okin's difference list, as if to simultaneously
reinforce the inescapable racial nature of the difference paradigm and dilute blackness by
nominally setting it on par with any other difference of which one can think. This move permits
Okin to ironically essentialize the anti-essentialist critique. Stripped of historical meaning, the
word "race" loses its moral force. With no mediating principle, a difference equals a difference.
This horizontal stretching cloaks the racialized context of United States feminism. In the next
section I briefly discuss critical race theory, a recent movement in legal theory which has begun to
investigate the hypothesis that race is indeed the paradigmatic difference. The critical race
theorists generally argue that a more thoughtful analysis of racism in America leads us to a more
informed and helpful understanding of other kinds of oppression.
BLACK WOMEN IN CRITICAL RACE THEORY

Critical race theory is a "race-centered enterprise" of liberation scholarship developed by a
small number of non-white law professors as a response to a post-Civil Rights Movement lull in
race-based activism.34 By the mid-1980s a small but influential body of work emerged, mostly in
the form of law review articles, that deliberately challenged traditional methods of legal scholarship
with creative meshings of legal discourse and personal experiences of racism and race-based
activism. Racism occupies the central, unify'ing force in critical race theory and all critical race
theorists conceive racism "not as isolated instances of conscious bigoted decision-making or
prejudiced practice, but as larger, systemic, structural, and cultural, as deeply psychologically and
socially ingrained."3 Although racism thus conceived assumes a paradigmatic blackness, critical
race theory recognizes how racism oppresses Asian Americans, and Latin and Chicano
Americans. 6 Racism for these scholars is a radical lens through which to analyze oppressions
based on gender, class and sexual orientation- The critical race theorists remove race from
ahistorical difference lists to expose the ways in which race cuts across gender, class and sexual
orientation.
While it may be argued that this move merely substitutes race for gender as the primary
"cutting across" model, it is important to note that critical race theory aims to develop theories of
multiple consciousness and interdependence that recognize that racism operates in tandem with
other forms of oppression. Critical race theory's tenet of multiple consciousness aims to theorize
about interdependence among a wide range of differences, including those not based on historical
and systematic exclusion and disadvantage such as class and sexual orientation." Nonetheless,
this potential can only be realized within a prior, highly developed account of racism in America.
Kimberle Crenshaw and Judy Scales-Trent both theorize about black women's legal
experiences of existing anti-discrimination law, taking racism, structurally understood, as their
point of departure. In contrast to Okin's de-historicized depiction of race, Crenshaw and
Scales-Trent provide deeply historicized models of gender liberation that conceive racism, not
merely as "significant," but as a central, imbedded capillary force that molds other oppressions.
364 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
33 Okin, supra note 2, at
327.
34
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The critical race theorists do not conceptualize power as possessory. As Kendall Thomas explains,
"[ijn Foucault's analysis, power is not a possessory interest. It is rather a more complex network
38
of practices that make up the general matrix of force relations at a given time, in a given society.
Of course critical race theorists differ from Foucault in that they focus on racism primarily, rather
than power generally.
Transcending the "cry" that all women are different, the critical race theorists offer
practical policy recommendations. 39 For instance, in the writings of Kimberle Crenshaw,
intersectionality is the theoretical basis and recommendations for revamped jurisprudence are the
The two existing
policy prescriptions that seek to improve the lives of black women."
anti-discrimination legal frameworks are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whereas Title VII covers any employment
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, color or national origin, the Equal Protection Clause is
subject to the Supreme Court's interpretation of a particular group's historical and current social
status." While the theory of black women's intersectionality has had a moderate, but important
effect on Title VII employment cases, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to modify its
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to address black women's intersectionality. 42
As Crenshaw points out, the first attempt to operationalize the idea of intersectionality
occurred twelve years before she wrote her ground-breaking article analyzing black women's
"double bind." In 1977, five black women brought suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, alleging that General Motors' seniority system "perpetuated the effects of past discrimination
against Black women."43 Plaintiffs produced evidence showing that prior to 1964 General Motors
hired no black women, and that after 1964, during an economic recession, all black women lost
their jobs in seniority-based layoffs. 44 Though the court refused to treat black women as a distinct
class, De Graffenreid v. General Motors illustrates one instance in which black women clearly
experienced a group disadvantage as black women, not as blacks or as women. The court's
opinion echoes Okin's worry about a difference proliferation, "[t]hc prospect of the creation of new
classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation and
combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box. ""
With this declaration, De Graffenreid seemed to issue the last word; despite evidence that
black women were discriminated against as a distinct group, courts could ill-afford to get into the
Thankfully, De Graffenreid did not quell the
messy business of "super-remedies."46
intersectionality problem for very long. Judy Scales-Trent notes that in 1980, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit ruled on the issue of whether black women should be protected under Title VII
as a discrete class." In Jeffries v. Harris Cty. Community Action Association, the court held that

black women are protected under Title VII as a discrete class because "discrimination against
black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women." 4
Jeffries, a black woman, provided evidence that every job she applied for with the the city had been
filled by either a black man or white woman." Consequently, she could claim neither racism nor
39
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sexism as the source of her discrimination. Jeffries marked a pivotal turning point. As
Scales-Trent wrote in 1989, "[s]ince then, every court which has ruled on the issue, has agreed that
black women can claim, as a distinct group, Title VII protection against discrimination based on
the race/sex dual status. ' 50
As critical race theorists, both Crenshaw and Scales-Trent deal specifically with racism as
it intersects with black women's experiences of discrimination. De Graffenreid and Jeffries
exemplify this intersection as it occurs in the lives of black women. Scales-Trent develops an
especially provocative prescription for the judicial treatment of Equal Protection cases involving
black women. As it now stands, cases involving discrimination based on race receive strict
scrutiny by courts and cases involving sex discrimination receive an intermediate level of
scrutiny.5 Scales-Trent argues that cases involving black women should receive "strict scrutiny
plus more" since black women satisfy the requirement for strict scrutiny, but experience increased
levels and unique kinds of discrimination because of their gender.52 Anticipating the "slippery
slope" objection, Scales-Trent states that the criteria of a discrete and insular minority would
sufficiently limit the scope of Equal Protection law to those who can form themselves into groups
exhibiting immutable characteristics (e g. race, gender, national origin, mental retardation and
(il)legitimacy), and a history of prejudice and political powerlessness. 53 I find this prescription to
be an especially innovative operationalization of Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality, though it
may be a long time before courts incorporate this radical idea into jurisprudence.
The gradual incorporation of a theory of intersectionality into Title VII employment
discrimination cases and Scales-Trent's well-supported argument for re-interpreting black women's
experiences of discrimination under Equal Protection law stand as formidable challenges to Okin's
treatment of race as "significant" but not primary in women's oppression. Crenshaw and
Scales-Trent demonstrate that courts have, to the benefit of black women, not taken as an
observable "fact" that gender alone constitutes the primary source of oppression for black women.
By placing black women's experiences of discrimination at the center of their theorizing, both
Crenshaw and Scales-Trent refuse to disembody and dehistoricize black femaleness. Their
historicized depictions of black women's legal experiences expose the superficiality of the kind of
difference lists referred to by Okin in her critique of difference feminism. 54
While critical race theorists' commitment to "multiple consciousness" aims to combat
oppression hierarchies, they clearly imply that racism, structurally understood, functions as an
especially powerful and historically embedded force in American law and society. But unlike
Okin's "pure" feminism, the critical race theorists do not imagine racism as a "pure" paradigm;
racism is central but constantly intersected by other "culturally salient" differences like gender,
sexual orientation and ethnicity. Hence, for the critical race theorists anti-racist politics cannot be
reduced to a "pure" picture of how racism impacts individual lives. "Pictures" of racism must be
historicized, which means that other oppressive forces, like sexism, inevitably enter.
My discussion of black women's legal experiences may invite criticism that I have
overlooked the very real oppressions in the lives of non-black women. To take the most obvious
example, how would a historicized account of racism address white women's experiences of
sexism? My answer is that both black women and white women can benefit from Crenshaw's
theory of intersectionality. As Crenshaw points out in her analysis of representational tropes used
by feminists and civil rights activists to describe Anita Hill, black women are not the only losers in
Scales-Trent, supra note 13, at 16-17.
Id. at 17.
51 Scales-Trent, supra note 13, at 2 1.
52
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the nominal separation between race and sex." White women's interest in dismantling sexism and
black men's interest in curbing the effects of racism are hindered, too. Crenshaw concludes:
"When feminism does not explicitly oppose racism, and when antiracism does not incorporate
opposition to patriarchy, race and gender politics often end up being antagonistic to each other and
both interests lose.' 56 White feminists who tried to place Anita Hill within a narrative of sexism
found themselves in direct competition with anti-racists who wanted to locate Anita Hill within a
narrative of racism. The result, as Crenshaw observes, was that Hill's experiences as a black
woman were erased and neither the "pure" feminists nor the "pure" anti-racists could articulate a
coherent account of that national disaster. 57
CONCLUSION

What the critical race theorists have given us so far is a new lens through which to
examine sexism. This has import for feminist political theories like Susan Okin's, which adopt
ahistorical "pictures" of oppression. Remembering racism as an especially salient oppressing force
in American law and society does not issue in the fragmentary demise of feminism. Instead, by
removing race from carelessly comprised difference lists and reinstating its historical meaning, we
catch glimmers of an emancipatory politics that situates gender oppression within its defining
paradigm in the United States: race.
Nonetheless, while I agree with the critical race theorists that racism, structurally
understood, is a logical starting point for a wide-ranging emancipatory politics, I am left with one
worry: Will this movement follow through on its stated commitment to multiple consciousness and
achieve a politics that goes beyond intersectionality and achieves interdependence? So far no
critical race scholar has produced a critique that incorporates more than one intersecting
oppression into its race-centered enterprise. More complex accounts of multidimensionality stand
as the movement's most pressing challenge. Audre Lorde imagined, as perhaps only a poet can,
that a true commitment to interdependence would transport us into "the chaos of knowledge," from
which we would "return with true visions of our future along with the concomitant power to effect
those changes which can bring that future into being." 58 Critical race theory exhibits great
potential for moving in this direction. Time will tell how far it gets.
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